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Abstract
Two policies toward payments-system risk are common, but superﬁcially appear
to be contradictory. One policy is to restrict the exposure to risk generated by
one participant to other participants who are, by one measure or another, directly
concerned with the risky participant. The other policy is to provide a “safety net,”
typically provided by government and funded by taxes collected from all participants
and even from non-participants, to share losses due to “systemic risk.” In this
paper, we provide a model in which both of these policies can be constituents of an
economically eﬃcient regime of payments-risk management.
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11 Introduction
Large-value payments are typically made through continuing, multi-party, contractual,
clearing and settlement arrangements. During the past several decades, there has been
progressively increasing awareness of the importance of risk management in such arrange-
ments. Because a very large loss can potentially be incurred if settlement of a payment
fails, how such a loss would be shared should be a matter of substantial concern for
the participants in an arrangement. Moreover, to the extent that complete contingent-
claims markets do not exist for insurance against settement failures and that there are
political pressures for governments or central banks to assume losses from such failures,
management of settlement risk is also a public policy issue.
Some speciﬁc questions regarding risk management in a settlement arrangement are
the following. If there is some risk of failure to settle a payment from one party to
another, should the payment be settled through that arrangement? (For example, in a
net-settlement arrangement, what is the level of risk at which a payment ought to be made
instead through an alternative, real-time-gross-settlement, arrangement?) If so, then what
considerations are relevant to determing whether third parties ought to share that risk?
Are there conditions under which the general public or the central bank (in the case of a
private arrangement) ought to bear some risk and, if so, what level of compensation would
it be approprate for them to receive? If a third party possesses private information that
would be of value in determining how best to settle a payment, how does the exposure of
that party to the settlement risk aﬀect the quality of information that the party chooses
to provide? In this paper, we address these questions by analyzing a schematic, formal,
model of a settlement arrangement.
Settlement-arrangement designers, managers, and policy makers are well aware that
the rules governing an arrangement can aﬀect users’ decisions about which transactions to
make through the arrangement. Thus, to set the rules of an arrangement is implicitly to
decide which payments will be settled through it, and which payments people will decide
to settle in alternative ways. (In fact, rules governing an arrangement that lacks stringent
risk controls are sometimes designed deliberately to make the arrangement infeasible or
unattractive for use in making very large-value payments.) By modelling the cooper-
ative setting of rules by participants in a settlement arrangement, and by participants
in the economy as a whole, from this perspective, we are able to analyze welfare ques-
tions in a conceptually satisfactory way. Rather than taking that approach of specifying
transactions exogenously as previous researchers have typically done, what we take to be
exogenous are traders’ utility functions, which we specify in a way that provides scope for
welfare-improving transactions among some of the traders to occur. We also specify a set-
tlement technology that imputes risks and costs to those potential transactions. Having
speciﬁed the model in these terms, we are able to characterize the patterns of transactions
that the traders would cooperatively choose to make.
This approach provides answers, for the class of model economies that we study, to the
questions posed above. Not surprisingly, risk considerations play a role in determining
which payments ought to be made. The speciﬁcs of that role can be quite surprising,
though. For instance, under some conditions it is not optimal for a risk-neutral third
party to share risk with the principals to a payment, even when the third party is a party
to the more comprehensive transaction of which the payment is a constituent. Yet, under
1other conditions, even the general public (that is, traders who would not have transactions
with the members of the settlement arrangement if risk were not present) ought to share
settlement risk, as can happen in practice when a central bank serves as guarantor of a
settlement arrangement. Private information regarding risk, even when it is possessed
by a third party rather than by a direct party to a payment, is likely to be untruthfully
reported unless the settlement arrangement is deliberately designed to elicit the truth.
While these results about a schematic model economy are far from constituting deﬁnitive
advice regarding actual settlement arrangements, we hope that this analysis may at least
provide a helpful framework within which to think in an organized way about the issues
involved in practical cases.
2 Modelling a transaction
Our ﬁrst task is to formulate a model of a transaction that involves a risky asset transfer.
The model should be rich enough to describe such a transaction recognizably, but simple
enough to be analytically tractable.
Consider what sort of model could satisfy both the requirements of richness and sim-
plicity. A transaction is a related set of asset transfers between traders. The assets
involved might be either commodities or ﬁnancial assets. An asset transfer involves two
traders, the donor and the recipient, but a transaction can generally involve more than
two traders. Therefore, at the very least, a model of a transaction involving a risky
transfer should include three traders, so that a distinction can be drawn between a par-
ticipant in the broad transaction and a participant (that is, the donor or the recipient) in
the speciﬁc transfer where the risk occurs. in order for the third-party participant in the
transaction–that is, the participant who is neither the donor nor the recipient of the risky
transfer–to be essential to making a mutually beneﬁcial transaction, there should be no
“double coincidence of wants” between the donor and the receiver. This consideration
suggests modelling the three participants as a “Wicksell triangle.”
There is a distinction between two types of third party (or potential third party) that a
good model ought to capture. A third party to risky transfer in a Wicksell triangle might
be intrinsically necessary in the sense that the donor and recipient of the risky transfer
would have no double coincidence of wants, even if the transfer did not involve risk
(that is, if the recipient would receive the expected value of the transfer with certainty).
Alternatively, the riskiness of the transfer might impair a double coincidence of wants
that would exist under certainty between the donor and the recipient, and the third party
might be needed solely to restore that double coincidence by serving as a guarantor or
insuror of the transfer. For characterizing the diﬀerences between the roles of these two
types of third parties, a four-trader model (including both an intrinsic third party and
a trader whose only involvement would be to share risk) can be useful. On the basis of
these considerations, we will specify the set of traders to be {1,2,...,N}, where either
N =3o rN = 4. In either case, we will assume that trader 1 is essential to a mutually
beneﬁcial transaction but that trader 2 is the donor and trader 3 is the recipient of the
risky transfer. When a four-trader economy is considered, the attributes of trader 4 will
be speciﬁed in such a way that trader 4 can only participate in a risk-sharing capacity.
The risky transfer will be formalized in terms of a probability space of events on which
a probability measure Pr is deﬁned.
2There is a distinguished event S,w i t h0< Pr(S) < 1. Assume that the risky transfer
from trader 2 to trader 3 succeeds in S, and that it fails in the complementary event
F. When we say that the transfer succeeds, we mean that trader 3 receives the entire
quantity of the asset that is transferred. When we say that the transfer fails, we mean
that the quantity of the asset that was intended to be transferred disappears irretrievably
from the economy.1
Later, to analyze incentive issues, we will specify that trader 1 privately observes an
event that is statistically relevant to the outcome of that risky transfer.
Assume that each trader i has an endowment consisting solely a type of commodity
that only he possesses. We denote that type of commodity also by i. Intuitively, trader i
is endowed with one unit of commodity of type i with certainty.
In general, a commodity bundle provides a random amount of each of the N types of
commodity in the economy. That is, each trader can acquire commodities by transactions
with others, and randomness is introduced by the riskiness of the transactions technology.
We use the letter γ to denote such a random commodity bundle.
Each trader’s preference between commodity bundles conforms to expected utility.
Trader i has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function Ui:RN
+ → R ∪ {−∞}.T r a d e r
i’s expected utility of consuming a commodity bundle γ is the expectation the random
variable Ui(~ γ).
The sequence of economic activities in this economy is as follows.
Initially, before knowing whether the actual state of nature is in S or F, traders make
an agreement for transfers of goods among them. The agreement among the traders is
binding.
With one exception, the transfers are safe. That is, everything sent out reaches its
intended recipient in its entirety and with certainty. The exception is the transfer of
trader 2’s endowment to trader 3. Recall that this transfer reaches trader 3 in its entirety
in event S, but is completely and irretrievably lost in event F.
The traders also agree ex ante on a second round of transfers, to be made after the
ﬁrst transfers have been completed and the result of the risky transfer has become known.
Thus the transfer to be made in the second round can be made contingent on which of
the events S and F has occurred.2
All second-round transfers, including the one from trader 2 to trader 3, are nonstochas-
tic. However, second-round transfers are costly. Only a proportion ρ < 1 of the goods
that a trader sends in the second round are received.3
1Failure of an actual transfer seldom involves such an irretrievable loss, although there are some
contemporary examples and many historical examples of that type of failure.
2Strictly speaking, this sentence describes a diﬀerent information structure from the preceding one.
If traders can only distinguish between events S and F on the basis of observing the success or failure
of a transfer, then they can not make any distinction unless a (non-zero) transfer has been attempted.
To assume that they can make a state-contingent transfer in the second round even if no ﬁrst-round
transfer from 2 to 3 has been attempted neglects this limitation of their opportunity for inference. In
the case where there is no private information, this ambiguity is harmless because risk-averse traders
would not cooperatively choose to make a state-contingent transfer in the second round unless they had
exposed themselves to settlement risk in the ﬁrst round. How the ambiguity is resolved is important
in the private-information case, though, and we will discuss this issue further when we analyze private
information.
3This assumption, sometimes called “iceberg cost,” can be viewed as a crude way of reﬂecting various
intuitive considerations including time preference and exposure to business loss due to delayed availability
3Traders consume their stocks of goods after these two rounds of transfers have been
completed. To simplify the characterization of traders’ consumption resulting from settle-
ment, we make two assumptions: that a trader is able to transfer only his own endowment
good, and that only a few of the possible ﬂo w so ft h o s eg o o d sa r ef e a s i b l e .S p e c i ﬁcally,
t r a d e rc a nm a k eat r a n s f e rt o2 ,2t o3 ,a n d3t o1 . ( T r a d e r s1 , 2 ,a n d3t o g e t h e rw i l l
constitute the Wicksell triangle to which reference was made earlier.) In addition, in the
version of the model where there is a fourth trader, traders 3 and 4 can each transfer their
endowment good to the other.
As described above, either all, a proportion ρ, or none of the goods sent may be
received. A transaction is a sequence τ =( τ1,τS,τF) of rounds of transfers. The elements
τ1, τS,a n dτF specify the initial round of transfers, the round of transfers in event S,
and the round of transfers in event F, respectively.









A transaction is feasible if no trader is ever required to send a cumulative amount that
would exceed his endowment. That is, transaction τ is feasible if
∀i τ
1




i } =≤ 1. (1)
Let T denote the set of feasible transactions.4
Now we provide an explicit deﬁnition of traders’ consumptions resulting from a trans-
action. To begin, informally let τχ be the random net trade that results from transaction
of transferred funds.
4As noted in the footnote above, the informational constraint that, if τ2
1 =0 ,t h e nτS = τF,m a y
or not be added to the deﬁnition of feasibility for a transaction. If all traders are risk averse, then the
constraint is never binding when traders have common information.
4τ, which depends on whether event S or F instead occurs. By adding the positions of a
particualar trader in all such net trades in which that trader is involved to the trader’s
endowment, the random consumption of the trader is determined. Speciﬁcally the con-
sumption vector ci(τ) that trader i receives as a consequence of transaction τ is as follows.
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We modify the core of an exchange economy to serve as the solution concept to characterize
the set of mechanisms to which the traders might agree. A core allocation is one that
can be obtained (according to (2)) by a feasible transaction, and such that no coalition
of traders can implement another allocation that its members unanimously prefer—with
at least one of them having a strict preference—by using an alternative transaction that is
feasible for its members. Deﬁne a core transaction to be a feasible transaction from which
a core allocation is obtained via (2).
To formalize the notion of unanimous preference within a coalition, for each nonempty











Also deﬁne θ ∈ T to be feasible for C if, with certainty,
∀i/ ∈Cc
i(θ)=z
i (No participation of other traders is required). (4)
Finally, deﬁne τ ∈ T to be a core transaction if there exist no C ⊆ N and θ ∈ T such
that θ is feasible for C and θ C-dominates τ.
Let us say that transaction τ is individually rational if it is weakly preferred to autarky
by every i ∈ N,a n dt h a tτ is Pareto-undominated if it is undominated for N.
Proposition 1 Let each trader’s utility function be locally nonsatiated, at all points, in
his own endowment good. Then a feasible transaction τ is a core transaction if and only
if the following conditions hold: τ is individually rational, Pareto-undominated, and not
either {1,2,3}-dominated or {3,4}-dominated.
4 Analysis of a public information environment
It will be useful to carry through our analysis using speciﬁc utility functions to show why
the preference and private information do matter in the settlement system.
5To this end, we study core transactions in some parametric versions of the economic
environment deﬁned above. We begin with a simple environment, where N = {1,2,3,4}
and there is no private information. 1,2, and 3 are the essential parties and 4 is the
stand-by party to transactions. We specify the traders’ utilities as follows.
U
1(c)=l n ( c1 + βc3)
U
2(c)=l n ( c2 + βc1)
U
3(c)=l n ( c3 + βc2 + ψc4)
U
4(c)=l n ( c4 + ϕc5)
with β > max{σ
−1,ρ
−1},0 < ϕψ < 1.
(5)
Here, goods received in trade are “better” substitutes for endowment goods for essential
participants 1,2,3. Trader 4 considers trader 3’s good to be a “worse” substitute for his
own endowment good, and trader 3 considers 4’s good to be a “worse” substitute for trader
2’s good or even for his own endowment good. We assume that the transfer technology
to satisfy 0 < ρ ≤ σ < 1a n dσ > 1/2, and we assume that βρ ≥
3 √
2.5
Analysis of this model shows that a core allocation exists, and that it has the following
characteristics.
Proposition 2 A core transaction τ always speciﬁes state contingent transfers. A typical
core transaction τ speciﬁes transfers such that:
All essential traders send ﬁrst-round transfers within the Wicksell triangle. In addition,
trader 3 sends a ﬁrst-round transfer (which might be considered to be an insurance pre-
mium against settlement failure) to the stand-by party, trader 4.
The ﬁrst-round transfer send from 2 to 3 does not supply all of trader 3’s consumption of
good 2. Rather, even in event S, 2 also sends a second-round transfer to 3. Thus, despite
its costliness, trader 2 uses the safe transfer technology to minimize exposure to the risk
of settlement failure in the ﬁrst round. However, except for this risk-mitigating transfer,
no other second-round transfers are made in event S.
In event F, both traders 2 and 4 make second-round transfers to 3. The transfer from 2 to
3 in this event is larger than the second-round transfer in event S. Thus, settlement risk
in round 1 implies consumption risk for trader 2 as well as for trader 3. Trader 1 shares
this risk by making a second-round transfer to 2. Moreover, trader 3 acts to minimize
this induced consumption risk for trader 1 by making a second-round transfer. (Although
3 has suﬀe r e dal o s sh i m s e l f ,i ti se ﬃcient for him to help 1 because of the diﬀerence in
their marginal rates of substitution between goods 1 and 3.) Thus settlement failure in
round 1 triggers economy-wide transactions in round 2.
5The condition for a small transfer at the endowment allocation, using the safe technology, to increase
the sum of utilities of the two traders is that that βρ > 1. Thus, the intuitive meaning of the latter
assumption is that traders would have clear willingness to use the safe technology if it were the only
transfer technology available.
65 Preliminary analysis of a private-information
environment
In the general discussion above, we have contemplated that a third party within the
coalition might have some private information, not possessed by either the payor or the
payee, about the level of risk. In such a case, the information is potentially relevant to
how the transaction should be conducted and even to how large a transaction ought to
be undertaken.
If the privately informed third party were involved solely as the reporter of that infor-
mation to the coalition, then there would be no problem about ensuring the truthfulness
of the report. In particular, if compensation were required to induce reporting, that com-
pensation could be made in the form of a ﬂat fee. If the possessor of information functions
in the payments process as an agent for one of the principals in the transaction, though,
then there will generally be an issue of whether there is incentive for truthful reporting.6
One might think, for example, that eﬃciency would generally require a payments coali-
tion would have to penalize an information provider when a payment would fail without
a warning of particularly risky circumstances having been given.
In this section we will show that there is indeed an incentive-compatability issue for
the payments coalition to resolve, but that there is no simple generalization about how to
resolve it. The incentive for truthful revelation of information depends on the pattern of
risk sharing within the payments coalition, the diﬀerences in risk attitudes among coali-
tion members, and the distribution of rents that is to be achieved by a core transaction
mechanism, which generalizes the notion of a core transaction to a private-information
environment. In fact, for the parametric environment that we study, some core mecha-
nisms involve a binding incentive-compatibility constraint for truthful revelation that a
transfer is likely to fail (that is, revelation of event L), while other core mechanisms for
the same environment involve a binding constraint for truthful revelation that failure is
unlikely (event H). As a practical matter, then, an implication of using the core transac-
tion mechanisms as an equilibrium concept for payment arrangements is that supervisory
authorities ought to accord substantial discretion to the governing body of a payments
coalition to establish rules aimed at eliciting accurate information from members.
5.1 Generalizing the model to encompass private information
To model private information, suppose that an event that is statistically relevant to the
outcome of that risky transfer will be privately observed by trader 1, who is not directly
involved in the risky transfer but who is an essential participant in a mutually beneﬁ-
6This idea, that a dual role of privately informed members of a payments coalition is critical for
understanding how the institutional design of a payment arrangement is related to the attainment of
economic eﬃciency, has previously been studied by Rochet and Tirole. In their model, unlike the present
one, traders’ information can only be revealed through their trades, and not by making explicit report.
In many actual payments networks, the limited opportunities for traders to make explicit reports seem
to fall between the absence of opportunity modelled by Rochet and Tirole and the completely adequate
opportunity modelled here. When traders are required to set prior limits (which will not necessarily
ever be binding in equilibrium) on their bilateral exposure to counterparties, for instance, their choices
of which limits to set can be regarded as partially informative reports of their private information about
those counterparties’ riskiness.
7cial transaction among the traders. To consider the simplest case of nontrivial private
information, suppose that trader 1 observes a signal that takes the value either ’H’ or ’L’.
Suppose that ’H’ and ’L’ satisfy
Pr(S|L) < Pr(S|H). (6)
The agreement among traders regarding the structure of the transaction, described in
section 2, is an ex ante agreement, made before trader 1 has received any information.
However, trader 1 will observe H or L before the ﬁrst round of transfers takes place. Thus
it is natural for the agreement to specify that trader 1 will report what he observes, and
that his report will determine which transaction to make. That is, the agreement among
the traders speciﬁes a transaction mechanism rather than a single transaction. Formally,
a transaction mechanism is a mapping µ:{’H’,’L’} → T .
Transaction mechanism µ will elicit truthful reporting from trader 1 if the following






Let M denote the set of incentive-compatible transaction mechanisms. We restrict at-
tention to incentive-compatible mechanisms, as is justiﬁed by the revelation principle.7 If
µ ∈ M, then the resulting transaction τ and the consumption Γi for each trader i ∈ N is







A core transaction mechanism can be deﬁned in a way that is straightforwardly anal-
ogous to the deﬁnition of a core transaction.8 Speciﬁcally, to formalize the notion of
unanimous preference within a coalition, for each C ⊆ N,d e ﬁne ν ∈ M to C-dominate











Also deﬁne ν ∈ M to be feasible for C if, with certainty,
∀i/ ∈C Γ
i(ν)=z
i (No participation of other traders is required)
(7) holds if 1 ∈ C (Incentive compatability) (10)
Finally, deﬁne µ ∈ M to be a core transaction mechanism if there exist no C ⊆ N and ν
such that ν is feasible for C and ν C-dominates µ.
With the core of a transaction mechanism so deﬁned, proposition 1 has the following,
straightforward generalization.
Proposition 3 Let each trader’s utility function be locally nonsatiated, at all points, in
his own endowment goods. Then µ ∈ M is a core transaction mechanism if and only if
the following conditions hold: µ is individually rational, Pareto-undominated, and optimal
for payments-system participants, and µ is not {3,4}-dominated.
7Myerson (1991) provides an exposition of incentive compatability and the revelation principle.
8Allen (undated) has previously used incentive-compatible mechanisms in this way to deﬁne a core
equilibrium concept for environments with private information.
85.2 A parametric environment with accurate private informa-
tion
Consider the three-trader environment in which trader 1 receives a private signal about
the success or failure of a transfer from trader 2 to trader 3. To simplify this preliminary
analysis, we assume that success and failure have equal probability, and that trader 1’s
signal is perfectly accurate, That is, we assume that Pr(H)=P r ( L)=1 /2, Pr(S|H)=1 ,
and Pr(S|L)=0 .
In this section, we work with piecewise-linear utility functions for the traders. Their
utilities will be deﬁned in terms of parameters δ and ², which are assumed to satisfy
0 <²<δ < 1/4. Utility functions are deﬁned in terms of the following functions on the
nonnegative real numbers.
V (x)=m i n {1,x}+ ²max{0,x− 1};
W(x)=m i n {1/2,x} + ²max{0,x− 1/2}. (11)




2(c)=V (c1 + c2);
U
3(c)=W(c2)+δc3. (12)
Because trader 1’s utility function is linear and information is perfectly accurate, the
incentive-compatability constraint reduces to the following two equations. The ﬁrst and




































5.3 IC constraint can bind in eith H or L
It has been proved that, in the three-trader environment, a transfer mechanism is in
the core if and only if it implements a Pareto eﬃcient (subject to both technological
and incentive constraints) allocation that is individually rational for each trader. An
allocation that maximizes a weighted sum of traders’ expected utilities, with all weights
strictly positive is Pareto eﬃcient. Therefore, for α ∈ R3






Regarding the transfer technology, suppose that
ρ =1 /2. (15)
9In this environment, it can be shown that the incentive-compatability constraint can
bind in either event H or L, depending on which value of the utility-weight vector α is
used for maximization of U.
6 Conclusion
The rules in a settlement system must encourage the participants to take optimal degrees
of risk in accordance with their attitude towards risk. If some participants have socially
useful private information, the rules in a settlement system must be constructed that it
does not give participant adverse incentives to mask their information. Policy makers can
achieve this objective if they think about the rules in a settlement system as a mechanism
design problem. If policy makers ignore those points and introduce new rules into a
settlement system, the equilibrium allocation of goods might be distorted.
If we regard the crucial issue in the settlement system as the eﬃcient risk sharing
among the participants in the presence of private information, this view allows policy
makers to consider the rules governing a settlement system as a kind of social safety net.
The eﬃcient risk sharing under the default of banks might involve the transfer of resources
from the agents who normally are not directly involved with the settlement network. The
central bank plays such a role as a lender of last resort, by transferring the resources of
general public into the banking sector during a period of ﬁnancial panic.
Appendix: Understanding central banks as a risk-sharing
device
The discussion in this paper is based on the view that the standard microeconomic theory
could be useful to analyze the settlement network. We try to understand the ﬂow of
funds between the parties as endogenous phenomena. We emphasis that both private
information and preference could play independent role to determine the optimal risk
sharing in equilibrium. The approach could be useful to design the regulations free from
unintended distortions caused by the lack of necessary consideration on the preference
and information set of participants.
We believe our strategy is consistent with the recent development of microeconomics
of Banking (See Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), Freixas and Rochet (1997)), and hope
to address the following issues more explicitly than the former literatures in a formal
model. Those include the distinction of private information held by the risky agents
versus that held by the other agent, the role of lender of last resort in the settlement
network, the interpretation of additive linear preference as an amount of cash ﬂow, and so
forth. However, some readers might wonder if to what extent our analysis is of practical
relevance since our model looks too formal. Therefore, in this appendix we show several
heuristic examples that support our argument.
We will discuss the following topics in turn; (i) the role of linear aggregator and
piecewise linear preference, (ii) the role of central bank as a lender of last resort, and (iii)
historical examples of barter trade that exactly match our model.
10T h er o l eo fl i n e a ra d d i t i v ea g g r e g a t o r
The literature of home bias points out that the proportion of assets invested in the do-
mestic assets are substantially high in many industrialized countries compared with that
suggested by the internationally diversiﬁed optimal portfolio based on the modern port-
folio theory (See French and Poterba (1996)). Moreover, so-called country speciﬁcc a s h
in advance constraint, although it is hard to explain endogenously, is commonly assumed
i nt h el i t e r a t u r eo fm o d e r ni n t e r n a t i o n a lﬁnance. (See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) for
review of literature). Those two lines of research justiﬁes to treat two goods as if imper-
fect substitute currencies, and additive linear aggregator is an useful way to measure the
sum of two goods. More speciﬁcally, the literature of home bias suggests that the risk of
exchange rate ﬂuctuation, the asymmetry in the tax systems across countries which could
encourage the investment on domestic assets rather than foreign assets, incomplete infor-
mation regarding the foreign countries as an potential explanations for the home bias. On
the other hand the diminishing liquidity in the foreign exchange market could potentially
explain the country speciﬁc cash in advance constraint. Such ideas shown in those liter-
ature seems to justify our discussion on the linear aggregator on two goods, which puts
asymmetric weight on the goods transmitted from the other participants once we regard
those goods as currencies. Moreover, the strong tax and institutional bias might tend
to exaggerate the choice of currencies, as French and Poterba (1991) have documented.
That evidence might be consistent with our piecewise linear utility function, which tend
to put the agents to the corner solution.
T h er o l eo fc e n t r a lb a n k
Throughout this paper, we argue that the fourth trader who works as if a lender of last
resort, can be viewed as a central bank only if there is no gains from trade with this agent
in the absence of risk. We argue that it should be just treated as a general public if there
is gains from trade without risk.
More formally, trader 4, who obtains goods at the usual time and sends goods to
trader 3, looks like an central bank if βγ < 1. Note that the fact this inequality does not
hold implies that an unit of exchange of goods between trader 3 and trader 4 is Pareto
improving, hence there is no wonder that trader 4 transfer his own goods to trader 3.
The implication of our model is that since the inequality does not hold ex- ante, there
is no gain from trade in the absence of risk. The fact that the marginal utility of trader
3, which becomes substantially high given the shipment failure from trader 2, induces
trader 4 to work as if a lender of last resort, because trader 4 sends goods to trader 3
only under the situation of settlement failure. The fact that trader 3 sends some goods
to trader 4 without shipment failure could be understood that trader 3 pays some fee
in order to obtain the insurance under the situation of shipment failure. Such pattern
of trade between those two traders looks as if a bank submits collateral and obtains the
discount window lending from the central bank (see original ideas on lender of last resort
Bagehot (1906), and Bordo (1990) for recent survey).
We stress the view that the forth trader plays the role of central bank, but it is
not diﬀerent from the usual traders intrinsically, and that there is no particular reason
to believe there are gains from trade between the central bank and others without risk
consideration. We further argue that if there were a risk in the settlement network,
11without central bank, there would be a private institution that works for that sake. Our
view is based on the U.S. history of banking. For example, Take agent 2 as New York
bank, agent 3 as Boston banks, and agent 1 as Philadelphia banks. Think about shipment
failure of one bank as default of banks. Safer shipment takes time because of inspecting
banks by checking the quality of banknotes. Note that the fourth trader would act as if a
clearing house of New York that starts supervising banks with membership fee. It gives
us our intuition that if there is no central bank by the political reasons, there would quasi
central banks by the private arrangement (See Gorton and Mullineaux (1987)). That
consideration justiﬁes our model captures some important aspects of the Free banking
area documented by King (1983) and the emergence of central banks. Such interpretation
suggests that our model is even consistent with the recent view to regard the role of Federal
Reserve As the supplier of settlement service among the private netting arrangements once
we regard trader 1,2 and 3 as the private clearing networks (See Summers and Gilbert
(1996) ).
Note that Green (1997) shows that by allowing traders to issue so called novation
securities, in equilibrium, both the initial securities and the novation securities will trade
at face value in a monetary economy a la Freeman (1996a, b). It means the risk induced
by trading-opportunity uncertainty will be fully insured, and eﬃciency will be attained.
The novation securities introduced below bear striking resemblance to the clearinghouse
loan certiﬁcates that were issued during those episodes in the absence of a central bank.
Those certiﬁcates, and the central banking role played by U.S. clearinghouses at that time
generally, are described by Timberlake (1984).
Loss sharing rule in the historical economies
Strictly speaking, we have discussed the implication of barter trade with risky delivery of
goods.
Given these limitations, one way of viewing our model is as a somewhat realistic model
of shipping insurance and other loss-sharing arrangements in historical economies. Early
modern Europe and feudal Japan provide such examples. Regarding Europe, Lopez and
Raymond (1955, p.259) reprint Genoese documents of 1191 and 1192, in which a merchant
pays a premium to a shipper who puts up security for the successful delivery of the
merchant’s goods. Moreover, some examples of insurance contracts involving third-party
underwriters can be found as early as the fourteenth century. In such a contract, the
underwriters are supposed to purchase for a certain price a certain amount of goods from
a merchant, but that the contract is to be void if the goods arrive safely at a certain port.
Feudal Japanese sea law, dating back to at least 723 AC, also pertained to an economy
that exempliﬁed the general features of our model.9 Most sea transportation was com-
missioned by government. Speciﬁcally, local government oﬃcials (owners of the cargo)
hired sailors to ship goods from their regions to the central government as feudal tax
payments.10 Sometimes bad weather forced the sailors to jettison the cargo in order to
9The following discussion is based on Takeda (1992) and Toyoda and Kota (1970).
10Even after taxes became payable in money, goods continued to be transported to the capital by sea
in order to be sold to raise the tax money. The common law of sea transportation did not change very
much from the one in the eighth century, judging from the one of the oldest written sea laws, called
“Kaisen-Shikimoku,” which dates from 1223.
12stay aﬂoat. In that event, the central government asked the sailors and the local govern-
ment to pay 40% and 60% of the damage of the cargo respectively. (That is, the central
government tried to induce the sailors not to abandon too much cargo intentionally by
introducing this rule.) However, if the ship sank or more than half of the sailors were
drowned despite having jettisoned the cargo, then central government did not ask them
(that is, either surviving sailors or drowned sailors’ heirs) to pay indemnity. These pro-
visions were evidently designed to induce sailors to take appropriate actions contingent
on the severity of the weather at sea–a situation regarding which they possessed private
information relative to the senders and receivers of their cargo.11
As well as serving as a fairly realistic model of such historical arrangements, it also
serves as a more schematic model of loss-sharing arrangements adopted by various pay-
ments systems today. It is noteworthy that the model explains these arrangements in
terms of standard concepts of insurance theory, without having to invoke unproved asser-
tions about a special, ill-deﬁned, kind of “systemic” risk.
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